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When James Otis argued the Writs of Assistance Case ' in 1761,
invoking Coke's statement in Dr. Bonham's Case 2 that an Act of
Parliament "against common right and reason" is void,3 he laid, said
Justice Holmes, "one of the foundations for American constitutional
law." 4 A tide of criticism has washed over Bonham's Case, pouring
into every crevice of Coke's citations," and making it slippery footing
for proponents of judicial review. But if we are to understand the
impact of Coke's words on his contemporaries and on Colonial America
we must, in Plucknett's words, "try to divest ourselves for a moment
* This article constitutes a portion of a book, CoNGREss VS. THE SUwPM COURT,
which is to be published by the Harvard University Press in 1969. Copyright @ 1969
by the President and Fellows of Harvard College.
t A.B. 1932, University of Cincinnati. J.D. 1935, Northwestern University. LL.M.
1938, Harvard University.
1 Paxton's Case, Quin. 51 (Mass. Super. Ct 1761).
2 8 Co. Rep. 114a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610). The pleadings are at 8 Co. Rep.
107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638. For citations to the literature, see Thorne, Dr. Bonham's Case,
54 L.Q.R. 543 (1938); J. W. GOUGH, FUxDA=MNTAL LAW iN EnuisH CoxsTrru-
TioNAL HISTORY 32 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as GOUGH]; 1 L. Bounur, Gov-
axm:N.rT By JunicIARY 75-77 n.2 (1932).
38 Co. Rep. at lSa, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652.
4 0. W. HoLmSs, John Marshall, 178 Mass. 624, 625 (1901), in Coulc-E LEGAL
PAPERS 266 (1920).
5 For caustic criticism of Coke's citations, see 1 L. BOUDIN, supra note 2, at 492-
517. See also Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REv. 30
(1926) [hereinafter cited as Plucknett].
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of the critical habits of the modern historian," who can draw on
resources that were inaccessible in earlier times,6 and "see the case
as it would have appeared to a seventeenth century lawyer." 7 So
viewed, a respectable case can be made for Colonial reliance on Coke.
Not that the validity of Coke's statement is essential to sustain the
structure that the Founders went on to build. The animating force
of an idea is not necessarily measurable by its verity. "We may deny,
for example, the validity of belief in the supernatural, but we cannot
deny its tremendous power." 8 Though one may doubt a divine
revelation to Mohammed, Mohammedanism nevertheless swept the
world. The importance of Coke for judicial review does not therefore
depend on whether he correctly stated the then existing law, but rather
on the fact that at the time of the Constitutional Convention, Colonial
America believed he did, and proceeded to act on that belief. None-
theless, it is my theme, a lawyer of the seventeenth or eighteenth
century might justly understand Coke to have meant exactly what
he said: that courts could declare void statutes which were against
"reason," a word that had a special meaning for the time: first,
because of reiterated acceptance of that opinion for upwards of one
hundred years after it had been uttered, and second, because the words
seemed to reflect the legal tradition of the preceding centuries. This
is not the prevailing view, and I beg to be indulged in an attempt to
rehabilitate Coke's statement as a source of what we term "judicial
review."
In the years preceding 1787, there was little or no incentive to go
behind Coke's statement, the more so because it was congenial to the
Colonial forces that were mounting an attack on parliamentary claims
of supremacy.' Blackstone, who first articulated the claim for the
6 Plucknett 40-41, 45.
7Id. at 41. See also Thorne, Introduction to A DiscouRsE UPON THE ExPoSICION
& UNDERSTANDINGE OF STATUTES 12-13 n.12 (S. Thorne ed. 1942) [hereinafter cited as
Thorne, Introduction].
8 H. MuI.LE, THE UsEs OF THE PAST 36 (1952). For years France was wracked
by dissension about the Dreyfus case largely because of popular belief in a false version
of his "guilt" propagated by the army. "What acted on public opinion in the Affair
was never what happened but what the Nationalist press and whispered rumor said
happened." B. TucnmAN, THE PROUD TowER 180-81; see id. at 171-226 (1965).
Charles G. Haines noted "the influence on legal thinking of incorrect facts and incorrect
assumptions when such facts and assumptions are believed to be true." C. G. HAnEs,
THE AmERICAN DOcrRINE- OF JUDICIAL SuPREMAcY 91 n.7 (2d ed. 1932).
9 "In the American colonies the [Glorious] Revolution meant something different.
Parliament was not their hero but a distant and unsympathetic body in whose delibera-
tions they had no part. When it aroused their resentment, therefore, it was natural
to remember the teaching of the great Chief Justice . . ." Plucknett 69. "It is
the tradition of Coke's time that passes over to the American colonies, for it is upon
the methods and constitutional views of Coke that the colonial lawyers were nurtured."
Goebel, Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 CoLum. L. REV. 555, 563
(1938) [hereinafter cited as Goebel].
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supremacy of Parliament in 1765,1° referred to Coke as an object of
"great veneration and respect," a "man of infinite learning in his pro-
fession, [whose] writings are so highly esteemed, that they are gen-
erally cited without the author's name." "' Jefferson recorded that there
never was "one of profounder learning in the orthodox doctrines of the
British Constitution or what is called British rights" than Coke.'
Coke's statement had been repeated (though without citation) by
Chief Justice Hobart in 1614; 13 it had been approved by Chief Justice
Holt; 14 and it had been taken up in the Abridgements.', Colonial
lawyers may therefore be pardoned for not going behind Coke to his
hoary citations, if they were indeed accessible.' 6 In the eyes of the
Colonists, "reiterations of the dictum by Coke's successors on the bench,
and by commentators, had given to it, by the middle of the eighteenth
century, all of the character of established law." 7
Professor Crosskey stated that the effects of Coke's "ill-founded
ideas . . . .were almost immediately wiped out, by 'the glorious Revo-
lution' of 1688 .... ," 18 In the seventeenth century the issue was
"between parliament and the king, and in this the courts and parliament
were allies." 2 The "Glorious Revolution," to be sure, established the
power of Parliament vis-A-vis the King; but Chief Justice Holt ap-
parently concluded that it left Coke's view untouched, for shortly
thereafter-in 1702-he stated that Coke's statement is "a very
reasonable and true saying." 20 The fact that the Revolution secured
10 "The omnipotence of Parliament was not the orthodox theory of English law,
if orthodox at all, even in Holt's time. It was first formally adopted . . . in
Blackstone's Commentaries. . . . Down to the Revolution the common legal
opinion was that statutes might be void as 'contrary to common right' . . . ." Pol-
lock, A Plea for Historical Interpretation, 39 L.Q. REv. 163, 165 (1923). Moreover,
"for well over a century legislative activity in the colonies had been subject to the test
of conformity with English law. Thus, the common law system had itself served as a
standard of right, in a sense as a sort of constitution." Goebel 567.
111 W. BLACKSTONE, CommaxtIxRIEs *72.
12 Quoted in E. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REvIEw 31 n.45 (1914). In
New York, ". . . Coke was by all odds the writer most used and cited. There are
many indications that this was true in other provinces." Goebel 564 n.25.
13 Day v. Savadge, Hobart 85, 87, 80 Eng. Rep. 235, 237 (C.P. 1614), discussed
in text accompanying notes 114-15 infra.
14 City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669, 687, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (IKB.
1702) discussed in text accompanying notes 120-22 infra.
15 See discussion in text accompanying notes 123-25 infra.
16 Cf. Phucknett 45. Only one Year Book appears among several catalogues of
well-known private libraries in New York, in the library of Judge William Smith.
P. HAMLIN, LEGAL EDUCATION IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 171-96 (1939). As late as
1766, Chief Baron Comyns of the Court of Exchequer lists in his Digest the medieval
precedents cited by Coke, under Comyns' citation of Bonham, giving them credit in
reliance on Coke. 4 J. COMYNS, DIGEST 340 tit. "Parliament" (1766).
17 Corwin, The Establishment of Judicial Review, 9 MICH. L. Rxv. 102, 104 (1910).
Horace Gray made a similar observation 100 years ago in his appendix to Josiah
Quincy's Massachusetts Reports. Quin. 526 (1865) (App. I).
18 2 W. CROSSxEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 941 (1953).
19 GOUGH 49 (footnote omitted).
20 City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669, 687, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (K.B.
1702).
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judicial tenure during good behavior 21 might have persuaded the
Colonists that it sought to strengthen rather than weaken the judiciary.
The "omnipotence of Parliament," said Sir Frederick Pollock, "was
first formally adopted . . . in Blackstone's Commentaries." 22 With-
out mentioning either Coke or Holt, Blackstone acknowledged that
"it is generally laid down more largely, that acts of parliament contrary
to reason are void," but rejected the proposition because "to set the
judicial power above that of the legislature . . .would be subversive
of all government," 23-- a statement that 150 years of American history
effectively refutes. Madison certainly did not conceive in 1785 that
Parliament had become uncontrollable, for he stated, "'The Judiciary
Department merits every care[.] Its efficacy is Demonstrated in G.
Brittain where it maintains private Right against all the corruptions
of the two other departments . ". . 24
Sound or not, Coke's statement became a rallying cry for the
Colonists when it was resoundingly invoked by Otis: if an Act of
Parliament had the effect claimed, he argued, it would be "against the
Constitution" and therefore void." His argument put a legal footing
21 S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HIsTORY OF THE AmmcAN PEoPLE 178 (1965). The
judicial tenure provision of the Act of Settlement was designed to stiffen judicial
backbones against royal encroachments. C. MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIA-
MENT AND ITS SUPREMACY 77 (1910). True, the Act of Settlement of 1700 made
judges removable on an address of both Houses of Parliament, but that procedure had
not been employed prior to 1787, and was employed for the first and only time in 1830,
when an Irish judge was removed. H. W. R. WADE, ADmINISTRATIVE LAW 281 (2d
ed. 1967).
22 Pollock, A Plea for Historical Interpretation, 39 L.Q. Rxv. 163, 165 (1923).
23 1 W. BLACESTONE, COMMENTARIES *91. In fact, Blackstone had not quite
sorted out his own ideas. Although he stated that parliament enjoyed uncontrollable
power, even to enact unreasonable laws, id., he uneasily noted that "the omnipotence
of parliament" is "a figure rather too bold." Id. at *161. He repeated the traditional
learning that "no human law has any validity, if contrary to" natural law. Id. at *41.
He also emphasized that the "absolute rights" of Englishment included "personal
security," "personal liberty," and "private property," id. at *127, *129, and stated that
the law "will not authorize the least violation of" private property. Id. at *139.
In his contribution to the ENcYcLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (1953 ed.) on Blackstone,
F. W. Sherwood states that "Whether through the natural conservatism of a lawyer,
or through his own tinidity and subserviency as a man and a politician, he is always
found to be a specious defender of the existing order of things." Id. at 687.
242 J. MADISON, WRITINGS 170 (G. Hunt ed. 1901).
25 2 J. ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS 127 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965). James
Otis left no doubt that it was for the courts to declare such act void. He said, for
example, that "the judges of the executive courts have declared the act 'of a whole
Parliament void'." Otis, The Rights of British Colonies Asserted and Proved, in
1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, at 408, 455 (B. Bailyn ed.
1965). Again, "it will not be considered as a new doctrine that even the authority of
the parliament of Great Britain is circumscribed by certain bounds which if exceeded
their acts become those of mere power without right, and consequently void. The
judges of England have declared in favour of these sentiments, ..-. . That acts
against the fundamental principles of the British Constitution are void," citing Coke,
Hobart and Holt. Id. at 476 (footnote omitted) ; cf. id. at 449-50. True it is that in
the same pamphlet Otis said that the Parliament was "uncontrollable but by them-
selves . . . . They only can repeal their own acts." Quoted in B. BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN RE VOLUTION 179 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
BAILYN]. Here Otis exhibits some of the confusion that earlier beset Chief Justice
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under Colonial resistance, and gave a fresh vitality to Coke that is
evidenced by a number of citations in the years that immediately
followed.26 The most extensive exposition was that of James Varnum
in the 1786 Rhode Island "paper-money" case, Trevett v. Weeden, a
cause cl6bre which Varnum broadcast in pamphlet form.2T If these
citations are scattered, they are countered by only one citation of
Blackstone."8 And the statements by Lieutenant-Governor Thomas
Hutchinson in Massachusetts, that "the people in general" relied on
Coke, indicate that such reliance was not limited to published citations.2
Thus, the argument that Coke had been discredited does not rest on
Holt, see text accompanying notes 120-22 infra. But as Professor Bailyn notes, Otis'
contemporaries were "unencumbered by Otis' complexities," BAILYx 180, and they
fastened on the idea that an act contrary to the Constitution is void. This was the
argument made by John Adams, with Otis concurring, in 1765, in opposition to the
Stamp Act. Memorial of Boston, Quin. 200, 202 (1765).
What "Constitution," asks Professor Bailyn, BAILYN 176. I would say, the only
"Constitution" that was known to a 17th- or 18th-century lawyer, the "supremacy of
law," which is discussed below. Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson did not misunder-
stand, for he wrote on September 12, 1765: "[O]ur friends to liberty take the advantage
of a maxim they find in Lord Coke that an Act of Parliament against Magna Carta
or the peculiar rights of Englishmen is ipso facto void." Quoted in Plucknett 63.
Similar deductions had been drawn by Justice Symonds in Massachusetts 100 years
earlier, see note 118 infra. So too, Jefferson regarded Coke as profoundly learned in
the "orthodox doctrine of the British Constitution or what is called British rights,"
quoted in E. Co~wiN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 31 n.45 (1914), rights which
Blackstone himself considered to be "absolute." See note 23 supra. In 18th-century
America, Bailyn tells us, "It was taken as a maxim by all . . .that it was the func-
tion of the judges 'to settle the contests between prerogative and liberty . . . to
ascertain the bounds of sovereign power, and to determine the rights of the subject,"
BAILYw 74. When the Colonists felt themselves threatened by legislative oppression
they not unnaturally again looked to the judges to "ascertain the bounds of sovereign
power, and to determine" their rights.
26 When Justice William Cushing, later a member of the Supreme Court, wrote
John Adams, "I can tell the grand jury the nullity of acts of parliament," Adams re-
plied, "You have my hearty concurrence in telling the jury the nullity of acts of
parliament." 9 J. ADAMS, WoRxs 391 n.1, 390 (C. F. Adams ed. 1854). In 1766, a
Court of Hustings in Virginia held that a law of Parliament imposing stamp duties in
America, binding on Virginia, was unconstitutional. 5 J. B. MCMASTER, A HISTORY
OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 394-95 (1905). In 1772, Mason argued, citing
Bonham's Case, that a Virginia Act making certain Indians slaves was "void," because
"contrary to natural right and justice." Robin v. Hardaway, Jeff. 109, 114 (Va. Gen.
Ct. 1772).
27 Trevett v. Weeden, 4 Am. St. Tr. 548 (R.I. Super. Ct 1786) ; Proceedings
Against the Justices, 4 Am. St. Tr. 586 (R.I. Gen. Ass. 1786). The cases are ab-
stracted in 1 J. THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 73 (1894), discussed in
C. G. HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 105-12 (1932).
28Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. Mayor's Ct. 1784), 1 J. THAYER, CASES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 63 (1894), discussed in C. G. HAINES, supra note 27, at 98-104.
The Blackstonian argument is quoted by Haines at 99-100.
29 In Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson wrote in September, 1765,
that "the prevailing reason [among "the people in general"] at this time is, that the
Act of Parliament is against the Magna Charta and the natural rights of Englishmen,
and therefore according to Lord Coke null and void." Quoted in Plucknett 63. Ire-
dell's statement in 1787 likewise reflects acceptance of Coke's doctrine. While noticing
the alleged "absolute power" of Parliament, he stated that "any act passed, not incon-
sistent with natural justice (for that curb is avowed by the judges even in England)"
would be binding. 2 G. J. McREE, Ln AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 172
(1858). In his Appendix to Josiah Quincy's Massachusetts Reports, Horace Gray
states that the Bonham doctrine "was a favorite in the Colonies before the Revolution"
and appends numerous citations. Quin. 527 (1865) (App. I).
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eighteenth-century judicial repudiation, but on inferences drawn from
Blackstone's principle of "legislative supremacy," " which the Founders
categorically rejected.,"
Today criticism of Bonham's Case as a "foundation" of judicial
review is more apt to be that Coke merely stated "a familiar common
law canon of [statutory] construction rather than a constitutional
theory." " Shortly stated by Professor Bailyn, the argument is that
"Coke had not meant . . . 'that there were superior principles of
right and justice which Acts of Parliament might not contravene'."
By "saying that courts might 'void' a legislative provision that violated
the constitution he meant only that the courts were to construe
statutes so as to bring them into conformity with recognized legal
principles." 8
For purposes of the present discussion it suffices to state that
Bonham was summoned to appear before the Royal College of
Physicians, and after examination was found deficient in medical
science, fined 100 shillings and forbidden under pain of imprisoument
to practice until he had been admitted to the College. When Bonham
continued to practice, he was committed to prison, after further pro-
ceedings, by the Censors of the College, and thereupon brought an
action for false imprisonment. The issue to be examined is whether
the Royal College of Physicians was empowered by statute to fine un-
licensed, as distinguished from incompetent, physicians, and more
particularly the Fourth reason adduced by Coke to deny the power.
802 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 941 (1953).
31 The influence of Blackstone on the Colonies is discussed in chapter 2 of my
forthcoming book. Here I shall mention only a few highlights. Gouverneur Morris
stated in 1785 before the Pennsylvania Assembly "that the boasted omnipotence of
legislative authority is but a jingle of words . . . . [F]reemen must feel it to be
absurd and unconstitutional." 3 J. SPARKS, THE: LnFa OF GOUVERNEUR MoRRis 438
(1832). In the North Carolina Ratification Convention, Maclaine noticed Black-
stone's view that "the power of Parliament is transcendent and absolute" and then
asked, "Has any man said that the legislature can deviate from this Constitution?
The legislature . . . . cannot travel beyond its bounds." 4 J. EL.IOT, DEBATES ON
THE FEDERAL CONSTIruToN 63 (2d ed. 1888). Iredell, a leader of the North Carolina
convention, and later a Justice of the Supreme Court, stated in a 1786 address respect-
ing the formation of the North Carolina constitution:
It was, of course, to be considered how to impose restrictions on the
legislature . . . [to] guard against the abuse of unlimited power, which was
not to be trusted, without the most imminent danger, to any man or body
of men on earth. We had not only been sickened and disgusted for years with
the high and almost impious language from Great Britain, of the omnipotent
power of the British Parliament, but had severely smarted under its effects.
We . . . should have been guilty of . . . grossest folly, if in the same
moment when we spurned at the insolent despotism of Great Britain, we had
established a despotic power among ourselves. Theories were nothing to us,
opposed to our own severe experience.
2 G. J. McREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 145-46 (1858).
32 Editorial note, 2 J. ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS 118 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds.




Since the College was to receive one half of the fine, said Coke, it was
judge in its own cause-a practice contrary to the common law:
[I]t appears in our books, that in many cases, the common
law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge
them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is
against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible
to be performed, the common law will controul it, and ad-
judge such Act to be void . . . .
Let it be assumed that Coke construed the statute as not conferring
power to fine in the premises because that construction would render
it void-in modem terms, a construction to avoid "constitutional"
doubt. To describe Coke's statement as a "canon of [statutory] con-
struction" by no means, however, exhausts its implications; there
remains his affirmation that a statute which makes a party judge in his
own cause is contrary to "common right and reason" and therefore
void. That statement is not deprived of constitutional significance
because it was uttered in the process of "construction." We would, of
course, be attributing to Coke an as yet undreamed of conceptualization
were we to conclude that he deemed himself engaged in fashioning
constitutional theory. Nevertheless, attachment of the label "con-
struction" to the germinal concept-an Act of Parliament that makes
a party judge in his own cause is against "reason" and void-does not
make what we term the "constitutional" problem disappear. Strictly
speaking, so far as the Fourth reason goes, there was no problem of
"construction." As Professor Thorne justly states, "The words . . .
were straightforward" 35-they plainly made the College judge in its
own cause. But I would not agree that in interpreting these words
Coke "was concerned only with the application of a statute." 86 This
was not the case of excepting the single, unjust application of words
that generally were applicable justly."7 Rather this part of the Act
was void in the only application it might have.
34 8 Co. Rep. at 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652.
35 Thorne, Introduction, supra note 7, at 85.
86 "Coke was concerned only with the application of a statute that led to results
'encounter common droit & reason,' not with the theory that 'an Act of Parliament
may be void from its first Creation' because of a conflict between its provisions and
fundamental, natural, or 'higher' law." Id. at 89.
37 "St Germain recognized [certain cases 'in which statutes had not been applied
in particular cases because of the injustice that would ensue'] as . . . . .. an
exception of the law of god, or the law of reason, from the general rules of the law of
man, when they by reason of their generalty would in any particular case judge against
the law of god, or the law of reason' . . ." Id. at 78.
The law of nature and of reason, states Holdsworth, required "abstract justice to
be done in each individual case, even at the cost of dispensing (if necessary) with the
law of the state." W. HOLDSWORTH, Som MAnams oF ENGLiSr LAW 93 (1938).
Even as an "exception" to avoid an unjust "application" the rationale differed little
from the general rule which governed laws in conflict with the law of reason. See
text accompanying notes 45, 46, 50 infra.
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Professor Thorne has put the issue into sharper focus: Did Coke
mean that the statute was void ab initio or merely "ineffective"?
Coke seems to be asserting that there were acts of Parliament
void ab initio since they conflicted with common right and
reason, but if this interpretation of his words is adopted one
has difficulty in explaining both the absence of the familiar
passages in the Doctor and Student, and elsewhere, that might
have been usefully cited, and his references in the same
sentence to repugnant statutes and acts impossible to be per-
formed. Such acts he likewise considered "void," but clearly
that section of an act which is inconsistent with another
portion of it need only be considered ineffective, nor need the
authority and validity of a statute that it is impossible to
apply be impugned."
Coke, continues Professor Thorne,
must be understood to say that "in many cases the common
law will control acts of parliament"-that is, will restrict
their words in order to reach sound results; and "sometimes
it will adjudge them to be completely void"-that is, will
reject them completely if modification cannot serve.
39
One who would take issue with Professor Thorne must tread warily,
for it is he who has made us aware of the shifting currents in the early
centuries and of the need for assaying judicial treatment of statutes in
light of the developing and changing authority of Parliament.40 Never-
theless, his analysis stirs doubts in my mind, doubts that I set forth
with deference, realizing that my suggestions may excite still other
doubts. In my view, there is little or no evidence that the distinction
drawn between void ab initio and "ineffectiveness" played an appre-
ciable role in Coke's time. Our own theorizing to one side, a seven-
teenth-century lawyer and a later Colonial might well have under-
stood-as, in fact, they did-Coke to mean simpliciter that no Act of
Parliament could contravene "fundamental" law. But first a closer
look at the suggested distinction.
To begin with Coke's omission to cite the "familiar passages"
that he "had used . . . in Calvin's Case," "' a case decided only two
38 Thorne, Introduction, supra note 7, at 86-87 (footnotes omitted).
39 Id. at 88.
40 See Thorne, Introduction, supra note 7; Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and
Heydoi's Case, 31 ILL. L. Rev. 202 (1936). His analysis of Bonham in terms of
statutory construction rather than constitutional theory has been widely accepted.
See, e.g., 2 J. ADAMs, LEGAL PAPERS 118 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965); BAILYN
177. For earlier views to the same effect see GOUGH 35.
41 Thorne, Introduction, supra note 7, at 86, 86 n.184. Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep.
la, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (C.P. 1608).
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years before Bonham, argued by almost all the notables of the day, and
decided by the Lord Chancellor and twelve judges. Coke himself
observed that the case was "the longest and weightiest that ever was
argued in any Court." 42 There Coke had said that "the law of nature
is part of the law of England"; he cited Doctor and Student (a work
published in 1518) for the proposition that it is "immutable," and went
on to say,
Parliament could not take away that protection which the
law of nature giveth unto him; and therefore notwithstanding
that statute, the King may protect and pardon him.4"
Here was judicial recognition that "notwithstanding statute" a subject
could not be deprived of rights protected by the law of nature.
Why didn't Coke cite Doctor and Student in Bonham? The
argument from silence is inconclusive, and against it may be urged that
having recently examined the point in a "great case" wherein Coke
had said that law on the point "appeareth plainly and plentifully in our
books," "' he might well have felt no need to repeat citations for a
point so generally accepted and so recently reiterated. From Coke's
citation of Doctor and Student, it may also be inferred that he employed
"reason" as equivalent to the law of nature, for that dialogue stated
that "The law of nature . . . is also called the law of reason," and
that English lawyers were accustomed to say that if anything "be
prohibited by the law of nature . . . it is against reason," precisely
the words employed by Coke.45  Under those circumstances a seven-
teenth-century lawyer might reasonably assume that Coke's "against
reason" was the familiar version of "against the law of nature." 46
From this important consequences flow.
4 2 Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. la, 3b, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 381 (C.P. 1608) ; see id. at
2a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 379.
43 7 Co. Rep. at 12b, 13b, 14a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 391, 392-93. Gough states that
"we need not read more into Coke's opinion than a willingness . . . to adopt a strict
interpretation of the law. We can find support for this in Bacon's speech on Calvin's
behalf in the course of the same case." GOUGH 45. Because, said Bacon, "civil and
national laws" "tend to abridge the law of nature, the law favoureth not them, but
takes them strictly . . . ." Calvin's Case, 2 How. St Tr. 559, 595 (C.P. 1608).
With Bacon's argument in his ears, Coke significantly chose to speak, not in terms of
strict construction, but of "protection" "notwithstanding that statute." 7 Co. Rep. at
14a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 393.
44 7 Co. Rep. at 13b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 393, quoted note 63 infra.
45 ST. GER AiN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, ch. 2, at 5, ch. 5, at 12 (W. Muchall ed.
1886). The same identification of the law of nature with reason was made 41 years
after Bonham by John Milton in his Defense of the People of England (1651). The
"foundation of all laws," he said, is the "principle, which likewise all our lawyers
recognize, that if any law or custom be contrary to the law of God or of nature, or in
fine, to reason, it shall not be held a valid law." 7 J. MILTON, WORKS 427 (C. Keyes
ed. 1932).
46 It has been said that "Coke does not use the concept of 'reason' the way the
medievalist did . . . he does not equate 'fundamental law' with the orthodox sense
of 'higher' or 'natural' law." Lewis, Sir Edward Coke (1552-1633): His Theory of
1969]
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Medieval law, said Gierke, "declared that every act of the Sov-
ereign which broke the bounds drawn by Natural Law was formally
null and void." 47 It is safe to say that early English lawyers would
have agreed.4" Gough considers that we must extend "belief in
natural law from medieval lawyers to lawyers of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries," " as in fact Coke recorded in Calvin's Case.
Gierke's version of medieval law was that of Doctor and Student:
if any law made by [man], bind any person to any thing that
is against the said laws [of "reason"], it is no law, but a
corruption, and manifest error.
50
On the justifiable assumption that Coke, who had cited Doctor and
Student in 1608, meant by his 1610 reference to "against reason" to
state the law of nature summarily, we may infer that he meant the
Act was void ab initio-if the refined distinction we now draw
occurred to him at all.
Does his use of "void" to comprehend "repugnant or impossible
to perform" compel the inference that he merely meant "ineffective"?
"Artificial Reasons" as a Context for Modern Basic Legal Theory, 84 L.Q. REv. 330,
338 (1968). "For Coke . . . law is a work of reason in this sense, that it is the
nature of law to be reasonable; and the test of its reasonableness, he thinks, is its
ability to withstand the test of time." Id. at 339. A Colonial who read his remarks
in Calvin's Case might justly conclude that Coke believed that a statute had to yield
to the law of nature or "reason" in its "orthodox sense."
47Quoted in C. McILwAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SU-
PREmACY 272 (1910).
48 "[N]o human law which was contrary to these universal laws [of "nature or
reason"] was valid." 4 W. HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 280 (3d ed.
1945). "The distinction between law natural and law positive . . . was part of the
medieval equipment In fifteenth-century England it was a commonplace of juris-
prudence." K. PICKTHORN, EARLY TUDOR GOVERNmENT: HENRY VII 164 (1934)
[hereinafter cited as PiCKTHORN].
"The prevalent mediaeval conceptions about law and politics would certainly have
led lawyers and statesmen to deny the proposition that there were no limits to the
things which could be effected by a statute." 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, spra, at 444 (4th
ed. 1936). Says Plucknett, "Of course, there is no doubt that the medieval mind would
never think of postulating the absolute sovereignty of Parliament or State." T. PLUCK-
NETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 319 (4th ed. 1947).
49 GOUGH 45. In 1604 the Speaker of the House of Commons included the law of
nature and of reason in the laws "whereby the ark of this government hath ever been
steered." Quoted in C. MCILwAIN, supra note 47, at 63 n.1. John Milton, in his
Defense of the People of England, adverts to "that fundamental maxim in our law
. . . by which nothing that is contrary to the laws of God and to reason can be ac-
counted a law . . . . 7 J. MILTON, WORKS 445 (C. Keyes ed. 1932). See also
note 45 supra.
50 ST. GERMAIN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, ch. 19, at 53 (W. Muchall ed. 1886).
Holdsworth comments, "no human law which was contrary to these universal laws
was valid." 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 48, at 280. PICKTHORN 134, states that
"Every judge of the later fifteenth century . . . however reluctant to 'annul any act
made in parliament,' would have agreed with a legal writer [St. Germain, author of
Doctor and Student] a generation later that 'against this law (of Reason) prescription,
statute, nor custom may not prevail: and if any be brought against it, they be not pre-
scriptions, statutes nor customs, but things void against justice."' ST. GERMAIN,
DOCTOR AND STUDENT, supra, ch. 2, at 5.
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Coke had lumped together Acts that were "against common right and
reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed," and all three were
indifferently cited as examples of Acts that courts would adjudge to
be utterly void." The word "impossible" was discussed in 1673 by
Chief Justice Vaughan as if it were analogous to a breach of natural
law, and so too of "contradictions" " which being "impossible to obey"
were "no law." 52 Vaughan was far closer in time and therefore
perhaps in sympathetic understanding to Coke than are we;
consequently Coke's enumeration of "impossible" and "repugnant"
makes it no more difficult to conclude that by "void" he meant null
ab initio than to arrive at "ineffective." The fact that language
suggesting "ineffective" was employed on one occasion,5 3 whereas
reference was made to "void" on another, does not without more
indicate that the judges had a firm distinction in mind. There is
danger of reading back into Coke's mind a differentiation that is clear
enough today but to which a seventeenth-century lawyer may have
been oblivious.' To give a meaning to words in the process of "con-
struction" that was "quite contrary to the text" in order to make
51 Thorne has called attention to early learning explaining "repugnancy" in terms
of "contradiction":
But what yf the wordes of an estatute be contraryant or repugnant, what is
there then to be saide? And suerelie thern we ought to make our construc-
cion as nyghe as we can in suche sorte that nothinge be repugnant; yet yf yt
can not be avoided but that a repugnancie must nedes be, then is the former
sayenge good & the thynge repugnant voide . . . . and therefore are the
former wordes good and the later, because they make a jarre by reason of the
repugnancye, shalbe omytted.
A DiscouasE UPoN THE Exposiciow AND UNDERSTAxNDiGE OF STATUTES 132-33 (S.
Thorne ed. 1942). Probably the Discourse was written before 1567. See Professor
Thorne's Introduction, at 11. See also Thorne, Dr. Bonhan's Case, 54 L.Q. REv. 543,
549 (1938).
5 2 MAter explaining that murder signifies unlawful killing, stealing is unlawful
taking, and that a royal "dispensation" (i.e., an authorization to kill as distinguished
from a pardon after the fact) would make them "lawful," Chief justice Vaughan said,
"So the same thing, at the same time, would be both lawful and unlawful, which is
impossible.
"For the same reason, a law making murder, stealing [etc.] lawful, would be a void
law in itself.
"For a law which a man cannot obey, nor act according to it, is void, and no law:
and it is impossible to obey contradictions, or act according to them." Thomas v.
Sorrell, Vaughan 330, 336-37, 124 Eng. Rep. 1098, 1102 (Ex. 1673). Is it far-fetched
to infer that for Vaughan "impossible" and "contradiction" (repugnancy) were
synonymous with "against reason" or "against the law of nature"?
53 Thorne, Introduction, supra note 7, at 87 n.186.
5 4 What Mcllwain has said is relevant: "Institutions that are now narrow and
definite become as we trace them back indistinguishable from others that we have
always considered equally definite. . . . To read the same definiteness into the
earlier institutions is not necessarily to put words into men's mouths which they never
uttered, but it is to put ideas into their heads that they never dreamed of." McILLwAI,
supra note 47, at 146-47. Compare Thorne, Introduction, supra, note 7, 28: "No
judge or serjeant had regarded the nonextension of an act to ancient demesne as an
'exception out' of the statute, accomplished through an exercise of judicial discretion,
for to say that ancient demesne was bound by an enactment but saved from its opera-
tion is a refinement (superfluous in a private-law scheme) for which no contemporary
support can be found."
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them agree with "reason" " might well have appeared to that lawyer
as "nullification" in fact. Would it ultimately matter to him that a
crucial portion of a statute was held void from its creation rather than
because the contradictory, "repugnant" section must be "omytted"? 56
The difference matters to us because we attach importance to concepts,
such as the separation of powers, which were as yet unborn." To the
mind of the seventeenth-century lawyer, we may conjecture, rejection
of a statute as "ineffective"-rejection, to borrow Thorne's phrase,
"completely if modification cannot serve"-would as effectively negate
it for practical purposes as would a flat declaration that it was "no
law" and void, as indeed Chief Justice Vaughan was not much later to
say about "impossible" and "contradiction." ," And so much may be
deduced from the excoriation of Coke by his eminent contemporary,
Lord Ellesmere, for "reversing" the Parliament, for "trampling upon"
and "blowing away" an Act of Parliament "as vain, and of no value." '9
If the distinction we draw today between "ineffective" and "void
ab initio" lurks in Coke's phrase, Ellesmere's diatribes suggest that
it was then of no practical consequence.
What Coke failed to state-"the theory that any act of the sov-
ereign that broke the bounds of natural law was formally null and
void"-was, in Professor Thorne's view, "soon advanced" by Chief
Justice Hobart."0 Patently restating Bonham, though without mention
of it,6 Hobart said, "even an Act of Parliament, made against natural
equity, as to make a man Judge in his own case, is void in it self, for
jura naturae sunt immutabilia, and they are leges legum." ' So far
as I can discern, Hobart differed from Coke's statement in Bonham
only in substituting "natural equity" for "common right and reason"
and in including the Latin phrase, which Coke had earlier quoted in
We are cited to no use of the words "ab initio" in the present context by Coke or
his predecessors; they said only that when positive law contravenes natural law it is
no law . Chief Justice Vaughan said the same thing about "impossible" and "contra-
dictions". In 1712, counsel apparently seeking to restrain application of the Bonham
doctrine to a "very clear case," posited that it meant "void ab initio." Plucknett,
supra note 5, at 58. See text accompanying notes 133-35 infra.
55 Fulmerston v. Steward, 1 Plowden 101, 109, 75 Eng. Rep. 160, 171 (C.P. 1554).
See note 67 infra.
56 See notes 37 & 51 supra.
57 GOUG 46, 48.
58 See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
59 ELLESMrERE, OBSERVATIONS ON TnE REPORTS 21, quoted in footnote to Bonham's
Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652 n.C. See text accompanying note 111 infra.
60 Thorne, Introduction, supra note 7, at 91.
61 Possibly Hobart did not cite Bonham's Case, says Plucknett, because his
"natural caution warned him against too open a tribute to one whose fortunes had
already begun to decline." Plucknett, rspra note 5, at 50.
62 Day v. Savadge, Hobart 85, 87, 80 Eng. Rep. 235, 237 (C.P. 1614).
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Calvin's Case, citing Doctor and Student,13 but which he had omitted
in Bonham. Coke's "against reason," as explained in Doctor and
Student, was the familiar reference to the immutable law of nature.
Let us now consider the matter in the perspective of "consti-
tutional theory." Commenting on judicial disregard of statutes in the
fourteenth century, Plucknett stated that "constitutional questions"
"were not asked." If it was desirable
to neglect some words of a statute, then they were quietly
set aside, but in doing so neither counsel nor judges enquired
into the nature of statutes and legislation, the sovereignty
of Parliament, the supremacy of the common law, the func-
tions of the judicature, and all the other questions which
the modern mind finds so absorbingly interesting.64
Professor Thorne arrived at the same conclusion. 5  This "free and
easy attitude" begins to disappear in the middle of the fourteenth
century, we are told by Plucknett; " yet as we pass through the fifteenth
century into the age of Coke, "the power of the courts to construe or
misconstrue legislation was unimpaired, and indeed increased..
Plowden . . . gloried in the liberty which the courts enjoyed in
playing fast and loose with statutes." 67
All this to be sure was in the domain of "private law," "public
law" being still in the womb of the future. But as Professor Thorne
observes, "That rights would have been infringed or unjust results
would have ensued upon the application of a statute had previously
63 7 Co. Rep. at 13b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 392-93: "[I]t is certainly true that jura
naturalia munt iminutabilia. And herewith agreeth Bracton . . . . Doctor and
Student . . . And this appeareth plainly and plentifully in our books."
64 PLUCKNEwT, CoNcisS HIsToRY, smpra note 48, at 314.
65 Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon's Case, 31 ILi.. L. REv. 202,
206-07 (1936). In Thorne, Introduction, supra note 7, at 71, he refers to "a group of
decisions that permitted acts of Parliament phrased in unambiguous terms to be com-
pletely disregarded since they led to results that were considered improper. No prin-
ciple of jurisprudence or political theory that might serve as an explanation was
offered." (footnote omitted).
66 PLucxNETT, CoNcIsE HISTORY, supra note 48, at 315.
6 7 Id. at 316-17. In Fulmerston v. Steward, 1 Plowden 101, 109, 75 Eng. Rep.
160, 171 (C.P. 1554), Justice Bromley stated, "it is most reasonable . . . to expound
the words, which seem contrary to reason, according to good reason and equity ....
And so the Judges, who were our predecessors, have sometimes expounded the words
quite contrary to the text . . . in order to make them agree with reason and equity,"
thereby exhibiting a sense of continuity with the past. And in Partridge v. Strange,
I Plowden 77, 88, 75 Eng. Rep. 123, 140 (K.B. 1553), Chief Justice Montague said,
"And that, which law and reason allows, shall be taken to be in force against the
words of statutes." Holdsworth explains that "the rules of equity are really special
applications of the overriding law of God or of reason or nature to the treatment by
merely human law of particular cases." 4 W. HoLDswORTH, supra note 45, at 280.
In the 16th century, states Professor Thorne, "statutes were not yet thought to
be exact formulas emanating from supreme parliamentary authority." Thorne, Intro-
duction, supra note 7, at 56. The whereabouts of sovereignty at this point, i.e., the
need to have a sovereign power somewhere, was but dimly understood by Parliament
itself. See text accompanying note 71 infra.
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[before the sixteenth century] been sufficient to hold it ineffective." 88
It is therefore of no moment in weighing Bonhan and its seventeenth-
century successors that they "had nothing to do with the great con-
stitutional questions of the age," and that "[t]hey were entirely private
disputes." ' For the important thing, the seed from which "consti-
tutional theory" was to germinate, is that when a statute was deemed
to unjustly prejudice one of the parties to a "private dispute," Coke,
like his predecessors, was ready to shelter private rights from statutory
infringement.
By importing our own preoccupations into analysis of Bonham
we becloud the issue that faced Coke. Coke was not confronted with
a dispute with Parliament but with an existing statute that impinged
on private rights, and the pivot of his thinking, I hazard, was protection
of private rights rather than a challenge to Parliament. To Coke "the
question of whether the legislature was sovereign or non-sovereign
did not occur, and indeed did not arise." 70 Parliament itself was
"slow to understand" the "whereabouts of the sovereign power of the
state"; and Holdsworth remarked that Coke "hardly saw" the necessity
"to have a sovereign power somewhere." 7' There was no occasion
to fashion a new theory to deal with a statute which invaded private
rights; he could meet the case before him by resort to the old. For
him "the political theory [supremacy of the law] which he found in his
medieval law books," said Holdsworth, "was good enough for the
seventeenth century .. .. . Little or no reason exists to saddle him
with our refined analysis, with a belief in the separation of powers and
judicial review, concepts that were formulated much later.73
68 Thorne, Introduction, supra note 7, at 41.
69 GOUGH 49. Speaking of the later distinction "between the Laws of Property
and those of Government," Plucknett observes that "To the middle ages they were all
one." Plucknett, supra note 5, at 52. As a conscious bearer of the medieval tradition,
albeit on the threshold of modern political thought, Coke, one may hazard, found no
occasion to draw the distinction. Even in the early 17th century, it would appear,
"every litigated issue of constitutional right was primarily a question of private law,
was raised by private law procedure, and was settled not as an affair of state but as a
matter of general law." Goebel, Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38
COLUm. L. Rxv. 555, 559 (1938).
70 GouGH 48.
71 6 W. HoLDSwoRTH, supra note 48, at 83-84 (2d ed. 1937). "Definition of law in
terms of sovereign will and the theories of its binding force entailed by them made a
relatively late appearance in the history of jurisprudence-certainly long after Coke's
time." Lewis, Sir Edward Coke (1552-1663): His Theory of "Aritificial Reason," as
a Context for Modern Basic Legal Theory, 84 L.Q. Rsv. 330, 332 (1968).
72 6 W. HoLDSWORTH, supra note 48, at 84 (2d ed. 1937). Plucknett, supra note 5,
at 30-31, considers that Coke had "a presentiment of the coming conflict of Crown and
Parliament [and] felt the necessity of curbing the rising arrogance of both," that his
"solution" was "a fundamental law which limited Crown and Parliament indifferently,"
and that he found the means in the old books. The logic of Coke's reasoning cuts
both ways, it is true, but whether he had spelled it out in his own mind in the terms
that succeeding generations distilled from his action may be doubted.
73 Cf. GOUGH 46-48.
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But if our conceptualization of "judicial review" was unknown to
him, the notion of "fundamental law" was not. Pickthorn refers to
the "medieval idea of the supremacy of the law, an idea of which it is
hardly too much to say that before the sixteenth century it was all
there was in England in the way of a constitution, [and] that during
the seventeenth century it was most of what there was . . . . " 4 Coke,
we have seen, believed in the overriding force of the law of nature,
and with Bacon, he believed that Magna Carta was unalterable. 75
English subjects considered that their rights and liberties were pro-
tected against the King's prerogative, and in 1628 Coke himself joined
in assertion of the claim. 76  But, states Gough, "Fundamental laws
(and Magna Carta itself) were valued for the protection they afforded
against the arbitrary power of kings. There was no suggestion yet that
the people's representatives themselves . . . might be tyrannical." 77
Because fundamental law was invoked against existing tyranny it does
not follow that unanticipated parliamentary tyranny would be deemed
to rise above fundamental law. To the contrary, both the law of
nature and Magna Carta were considered to override all conflicting
74 
PICKTHORN 55; compare Coke's ideas discussed in the text accompanying note
72 supra.
75 C. MCILwAI, THE HIGH COURT or PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREACY 64
(1910). Coke spoke of Magna Carta as an "ancient, and fundamentall law" 2 E. COKE,
IxsnmUTEs *51. He also stated that "if any statute be made to the contrary of Magna
Charta it shall be holden for none. And therefore if [a statute] . . . be contrary
thereunto, it is repealed . . ." 3 id. *111. See also 2 id. *37. If Magna Carta was
alterable by subsequent Parliaments, the fact that it was confirmed by later Parlia-
ments upwards of 40 times must have impressed "on later generations the conviction
that Magna Carta was no ordinary statute but of special permanence and importance."
GOUGH 16.
7 6 
GOUGH 61-62. After marshalling a group of instances in which Parliament
had spoken for fundamental liberties and rights of Englishmen, William Prynne said
"That the Kingdome, and Freemen of England, have some ancient, hereditary Rights,
Liberties, Franchises, Priviledges, Customes, properly called FUNDAMENTALL . . .
no wayes to be altered, undermined, subverted, directly or indirectly, under the guilt
and pain of High Treason in those who attempt it . . . ." W. PRYNNE, A SEASON-
ABLE LEGALL, AND HISTORICALL VINDICATION . . . OF THE GOOD, OLD, FUxDA-
MENTALL, LIBETIES, . . . OF ALL ENGLISH FREEMEN . . . , at 54 (1654). "In a con-
ference between the houses in 1628, the Archbishop of Canterbury, on the part of the
House of Lords, promised 'to maintain and support the fundamental laws of the king-
dom, and the fundamental Liberties of the Subject.' Sir Dudley Digges in reply
expressed the gratification of the Commons at the willingrfess of the Lords 'to main-
tain and support the fundamental laws and liberties of England'." McILWAnm, supra
note 75, at 82.
Protection of private rights was also the theme of a Massachusetts judge in 1657,
Giddings v. Browne (Ipswich, Mass. 1657), 2 HuTcHiNsoN PAPERS 1 (Prince Socy
Pub. 1865), discussed in note 118 infra. In 1765 Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson of
Massachusetts relayed the claim to protection of "the peculiar rights of Englishmen,"
see note 25 supra. Blackstone himself enumerated the "absolute rights" of English-
men, stating that the law "will not authorize the least violation of private property."
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *127, *139. Jefferson identified the British Con-
stitution with "what is called British rights," quoted in E. CORWIN, THE DocTRI E
OF JUDIcIAL RmvivW 31 n.45 (1914), and in 1785 Madison praised English courts for
maintaining "private Right against all the corruptions of the two other departments."
2 J. MADISON, WRITINGS 170 (G. Hunt ed. 1901).
7 GOUGH 65.
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laws, 78 so that an appeal to fundamental law against a statute was
entirely logical. 9 "All through his life," said Holdsworth, Coke "had
held firmly to the [idea] that the law must be supreme . . . . " When
Bonham came down, Parliament was struggling for power and as yet
could lay no claim to a greater than royal prerogative. Indeed, the
arguments used by the parliamentary opposition against overweening
royal claims "encouraged the belief that in the common law there
might be found a store of principles which could be used to demonstrate
the illegality of particular exercises of arbitrary power." s' One who,
like Coke, could proffer the Petition of Right (1628), which grew
out of his bill "for the better securing of every freeman touching the
propriety of his goods and liberty of his person," 8' in the teeth of
arrogant claims to absolute royal power, would hardly shrink from con-
demning an infringing arbitrary statute. There is no need to assume
that Englishmen who were preparing to shed their blood in defense
of their rights against royal arbitrariness were ready to suffer arbi-
trariness at the hands of their own elected Parliament. They turned
to Parliament because they trusted it to protect their rights against
royal despotism, not to substitute parliamentary tyranny. As Jefferson
78 "No human law which was contrary to these universal laws was valid."
4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 48, at 280. See also note 75 mipra.
79 GOUGr 49, says of Bonha's Case and Day v. Savadge, that
fundamental law was not mentioned in them. Coke and his colleagues cer-
tainly talked of fundamental law (though not in court), and there was indeed
a connexion between this idea and their judicial decisions, but it was only a
connexion, not an identity. Indeed there could not be an identity, for funda-
mental law in the seventeenth century was an ill-defined term which covered
a wide field, and could not be identified with any one thing.
Nevertheless, Gough states that "Fundamental laws (and Magna Carta itself) were
valued for the protection they afforded against the arbitrary power of kings." Id. at
65. He also called attention to "other passages in Coke's writings which lend colour to
the theory that he believed in the existence of a body of fundamental law." Id. at 40.
Compare Coke's statement that a statute contrary to the Magna Carta "shall be
holden for none." 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *111. In his Postscript, GOUGH 222, adds
that "In the seventeenth century it was constitutional limitations to absolute power-
generally to the power of the monarchy, but sometimes also to the power of parlia-
ment-which above all were claimed as fundamental." If Coke and his fellows did not
attach the label "fundamental" to the law of nature or "reason" or "natural equity," it
was certainly so regarded in the particular case. Coke left no doubt that Magna Carta
was "fundamental," and presumably he felt no need to separate and ticket the various
strands of fundamental law.
80 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 48, at 454 (3d ed. 1945). Said Holdsworth,
"According to Coke's view, the common law was the supreme law in the state, and the
judges, unfettered and uncontrolled save by the law, were the sole exponents of this
supreme law." W. HOLDSWORTH, SOME MAKERS OF ENGLISH LAW 115 (1938). Coke
"preserved the medieval idea of the supremacy of the law, at a time when political
speculation was tending to assert the necessity of the supremacy of a sovereign person
or body, which was above the law . . . ." Id. at 126. The "establishment of the rule
of law" was "due mainly to Coke's insistence on the supremacy of the common law."
Id. at 131-32.
81 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 48, at 435 (3d ed. 1945).
82 Id. at 451-52.
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was to say many years later, after the battle against Parliament had
been won and the issue was arbitrariness of state legislatures, "An
elective despotism was not the government we fought for." 8
Having no reason to suspect that Parliament would be arbitrary,
Coke could assume that there was no deliberate arbitrariness in the
statute before him, the more so because "Parliament had always con-
tended for the medieval idea of the supremacy of the law." 84 Un-
troubled by "parliamentary sovereignty," he could, like his predecessors,
decide the "private dispute" without reference to "constitutional ques-
tions." If no predecessor had actually declared that an act which
contravened natural law is void,"5 many acts had been "quietly set
aside" for the protection of private rights. Coke's advance was to
make the tacit explicit, to identify a statute as an Act of Parliament, to
articulate judicially what was generally accepted doctrine-a law con-
trary to "reason" is void-to proceed from "quietly" setting a statute
aside "upon the dictate of legal reasonableness" 11 to explicit recognition
that a statute contrary to "reason" is to be declared void-a process to
which we assign the label "nullification." 87 That Coke believed him-
self covered by early precedents does not, in my view, militate against
an appeal to "any 'fundamental, higher, or natural law.' " 88 Plucknett
states that Coke "added" his "common right and reason" to one of his
early citations wherein the court had merely "ignored" the statute, 9
83T. JEFrFRsox, Notes on Virginia *214, in 3 WRITINGS 68, 224 (P. Ford ed.
1892-1899). See also the statement of Iredell, quoted in 2 G. J. McRE, Ln Am
CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL, 145-46 (1858).
846 W. HoLDSWORTH, supra note 48, at 243 (2d ed. 1937). Compare note 76
supra. Holdsworth remarks on the "old alliance between Parliament and the common
law, to which in the past both the common law and the Parliament had owed so
much." 5 W. HoLDswoRTH, upra note 48, at 444 (3d ed. 1945).
85 PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 48, at 319: "[Wle do not find in
mediaeval English cases any decisions which clearly hold that a statute is void because
it contravenes some fundamental principle." According to Gough "we shall look in
vain for a case where statutes were actually nullified by a judicial decision." GOUGH
145. And compare Gough's reference to "judicial nullification, or judicial review."
Id. at 48.
s Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydmns Case, 31 IL. L. REv. 202, 206-07
(1936).
87 See GOUGHT 34, 145, and the passage quoted note 85 spra. If I do not mis-
understand him, Professor Thorne considers that Coke could have reached his result
on the "theory that any act of the sovereign that broke the bounds of natural law was
formally null and void," Thorne, Introduction, supra note 7, at 91, but that words which
might have accomplished this, and which he employed in Calvin's Case, are missing
from Bonham. See text accompanying notes 39, 41-44 supra.
8 8 GOUGH 40, quoting Thorne, supra note 2, at 552.
89 In citing an ancient case wherein the court had merely "ignored" the statute,
Coke, in Bonliam's Case, "added" the phrase "because it would be against common
right and reason, the common law adjudges the said act of parliament as to that point
void." Plucknett, supra note 5, at 36.
In 1320, Hugh le Despenser and his son complained to King Edward II of an
award of banishment made by the assembled barons as being made "wrongfully against
the laws and usages of the realm, and against common right and reason." Case of
Hugh le Despenser (K.B. 1320), 1 How. St. Tr. 23, 33 (1809).
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thereby equating a "quiet" setting aside with an application of the
law of "reason." " When this is viewed in light of his assertion in
Calvin's Case that "Parliament could not take away that protection
which the law of nature giveth unto" a subject,9 1 his later statement in
the Institutes that if a statute "be made to the contrary of Magna Carta,
it shall be holden for none," 12 as well as the fact that his phrase,
'"against common right and reason," may fairly be regarded as short-
hand for the law of nature and Magna Carta, it is easier, for me at
least, to regard these several expressions as parts of a coherent political-
legal theory rather than unrelated, compartmentalized utterances.93
Other arguments have been advanced for the view that Coke was
only engaged in statutory construction. It has been maintained that
the juxtaposition of the Fifth reason-that unless the two clauses of
the statute were distinct an unlicensed physician would be liable to a
fine under the first clause and also to a fine under the second, an
absurdity, for no one should be punished twice for the same offense 94_
with the Fourth reason, "against common right and reason," supports
this view. Professor Thorne would read Coke's argument thus:
"just as it would be absurd to interpret the statute [to permit two
punishments for one offense] so it would be absurd to interpret it to
permit the college to be party and judge, that is to assess fines in which
it shares." " Brownlow's report of Bonham does indeed state that if
the college shall be "judges and parties also," this is "absurd." " But
in his own report Coke was at pains to confine his argument of absurdity
to the Fifth reason; and we should not be too quick to join what he
kept asunder. Moreover, points out Plucknett, Coke had "added" to
the report of the ancient Cessavit 42, cited in support of the Fourth
reason, the words "because it would be against common right and
reason, the common law adjudges the said Act of Parliament as to
that point void," I when, according to Plucknett, "the statute is
90Under Coke's reasoning, "The newer decisions had not changed the law-they
had merely developed or explained the truth to be found concealed in the oldest
authorities." 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 48, at 473 (3d ed. 1945).
917 Co. Rep. at 14a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 393. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
92 3 E. Corm, INsTITUTES *111.
93 Coke, Holdsworth stated, "preserved the mediaeval idea of the supremacy of
the law ;" for him "the common law was the supreme law in the state" of which the
judges "were the sole exponents ;" and he "had demonstrated from the bench that the
common law was the greatest safeguard against arbitrary power." W. HoLDSWoRTH,
SOME MAKERS or ENGLISH LAW 126, 115, 116 (1938).
94 8 Co. Rep. at 118b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 654. The argument is more fully spelled
out in Thorne, Dr. Bonham's Case, 54 L.Q. REv. 543, 547 (1938).
95 Thorne, Dr. Bonhan's Case, supra note 94, at 548.
96 2 Brownlow, 255, 265, 123 Eng. Rep. 928, 933 (C.P. 1610).
97 8 Co. Rep. at lSa, 77 Eng. Rep. at 653.
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not held void; it is just ignored." 9 Such pains are incompatible with
an attempt merely to restate "absurdity" in novel and involved fashion,
but breathe rather an intention to furnish an additional reason. With
Plucknett I would say that in his Fourth reason "Coke has really
added an explanation and a theory all his own," 99 adding only that
it was an explanation rooted in the past.
There remains the other portion of the Fourth reason, the phrase
"repugnant or impossible to be performed." Repugnancy, Professor
Thorne concluded from an early seventeenth-century treatise on statu-
tory construction, is "a contradiction; it occurs when a statute provides
one thing, and then through oversight perhaps, its opposite," '00 in
which case, according to the treatise, "are the former wordes good and
the later, because they make a jarre by reason of the repugnancye,
shalbe omytted." "' Faced by contradictory provisions a court would
save something from the collision rather than let the statute fail; and
Professor Thorne justly infers that there "is no conscious consti-
tutional problem raised here, but only one of statutory construction." 102
He then suggests that "Though not technically a repugnancy, certainly
a statute making a man judge in his own case and a self-contradictory
statute might well be regarded as cognate," 103 a conclusion to which
the precedents might have led Coke. But why dress that result in an
additional formula when "impossibility and repugnancy" might have
sufficed, particularly since he imposed his "against reason" gloss on
Cessavit 42, and because his reference to "against reason" suggests a
reference to the law of nature which no act could contravene?
Still another comment by Coke needs to be taken into account;
in his Second Institute, Coke, explaining an old case wherein the
statute provided that the assize should not be held except in the
counties of the parties concerned, said that a writ was allowed out of
the county so that a party in a particular case would not be both
judge and party lest "he should have right and no remedy by Law
given for the wrong done unto him, which the Law will not suffer,
and therefore this case of necessity is by construction excepted out
93 Plucknett, supra note 5, at 36.
99 Id. He said it was a "revival" of earlier "law." Id. at 45.
100 Thorne, Dr. Bonhan's Case, 54 L.Q. Rxv. 543, 549 (1938).
101 DiscOuRsE, supra note 51, at 133.
102 Thorne, Dr. Bonham's Case, 54 L.Q. REv. 543, 549 (1938).
103 Thorne, Dr. Bonhan's Case, 54 L.Q. REV. 543, 549 (1938). Coke, it seems to
me, was too fastidious to regard mere "contradiction" as "cognate" with the judge-
party situation that was morally "wrong" and inala in se. One need only recall that
he did not follow Bacon's suggestion of "strict interpretation" in Calvins Case (see
note 43 supra) that he eschewed the argument of "absurdity" in the Fourth reason
which he then made in the Fifth reason, see text accompanying notes 94-98 supra, and
that he preferred not to rest on an "exception by construction," an argument which
his fellow Judge Daniel was ready to adopt, see text accompanying notes 106-07 infra.
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of the Statute." 104 "More pointed comment on Bonham's case," says
Gough, "is hardly needed." ' Coke, however, plainly avoided putting
his decision in Bonham on "exception by construction." Justice Daniel
was prepared to rule that a doctor was excepted from the Act,'016 but
Coke stated that he did not speak to this point because "he and
Warburton and Daniel agreed, that this action was clearly maintain-
able for two other points." 10' Bonhamn cannot therefore be explained
in terms of a statutory construction doctrine which Coke, by his own
statement of the case, felt it unnecessary to consider.
Such doubts about Coke's meaning as might have been enter-
tained by a Colonial lawyer might well have been dispelled by the
strictures of Lord Ellesmere. In his address at the installation of Sir
Henry Montague as successor to Coke as Lord Chief Justice, Ellesmere
called attention to the demotion of Montague's predecessor and ad-
monished Sir Henry to follow the practice of his own grandfather
"when he sate Chief Justice in the Common Pleas." He did not
claim for the judges
power to judge Statutes and Acts of Parliament to be void,
if they conceived them to be against common right and
reason [a shaft at Coke] ; but left the King and the Parliament
to judge what was common right and reason. I speak not of
impossibilities or direct repugnances)'
Professor Thorne suggests that the qualifying adjective "direct" seems
to indicate that to Ellesmere "Coke's theory was directed toward
interpretation broadened to indirect repugnances, that is, contradictions
not on the statute's face." ' Ellesmere, however, "left the King and
Parliament to judge what was common right and reason"; from this
area judges were excluded, while he carefully preserved for them the
right to consider legitimate "repugnancy." His separation of "re-
pugnancy" from "right and reason" indicates concern with a differ-
entiation of functions rather than a sharpening of definition to guide
the judges. His qualifying "direct" repugnancy is of a piece with
his counsel not to "strain the statute" or to make "an absurd or
inept new construction." 110 Judicial exercise of a power "left to King
and Parliament" was something else again-this was to overthrow,
rather than to misconstrue, a statute.
104 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *25.
105 GTOUGH, supra note 3, at 36.
106 8 Co. Rep. at 116b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 650.
107 Id.; Thorne, Dr. Bonham's Case, 54 L.Q. REv. 543, 546 (1938), considers
that exception from the statute by construction was not possible for several reasons,
and that Coke therefore turned from that path.
108 Reported in Moore K.B. 826, 828, 72 Eng. Rep. 931, 932 (1613).
109 Thorne, Dr. Bonhan's Case, 54 L.Q. REv. 543, 552 (1938).
110 Moore K.B. at 828, 72 Eng. Rep. at 932.
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That it was overthrow, or reversal, of a Parliamentary act which
Ellesmere had in mind is suggested in yet another of his critiques of
Coke in the Earl of Oxford's Case:
It seemeth, by the Lord Coke's report . . . in Dr.
Bonham's Case, That Statutes are not so sacred as that the
Equity of them may not be examined. For he saith, That in
many Cases the Common Law hath such a Prerogative, as
that it can controul Acts of Parliament, and adjudge them
void; as if they are against Common Right, or Reason, or
Repugnant, or impossible to be performed . . . .And yet
our Books are, That the Acts and Statutes of Parliament
ought to be reversed by Parliament (only) and not
otherwise."'
After thus reproaching Coke for "reversing" Parliament, Ellesmere
turned to the "Judges" usurpation of the Chancellor's role, of "making
Construction of [statutes] according to Equity . . . and enlarging
them pro bono publico, against the Letter and Intent of the Makers." 112
Again a Colonial lawyer might conclude that Ellesmere had dis-
tinguished the "reversal" of Parliament by resort to "common right
and reason" from the act of "construction." On still another occasion
Ellesmere chided Coke for his decision in Dr. Bonham's Case because
he "tramples upon the Act of Parliament . . .whereby that patent
[to the College] was confirmed, blowing them both away as vain, and
of no value," "' once more indicating that he was taking aim at Coke's
declaration that a statute was void because "against reason."
Let us move from Coke to Hobart, Chief Justice of Common Pleas
who, in Day v. Savadge, stated that "even an Act of Parliament, made
against natural equity, as to make a man Judge in his own case, is
void in it self, for jura naturae sunt immutabilia, and they are leges
legum." 114 Here the Bonham "against reason" stands alone, un-
accompanied by "repugnancy"; and Hobart's reference to the im-
mutable law of nature again suggests that Coke employed "reason" in
the sense earlier explained by Doctor and Student. Plucknett observes,
"Clearly, then, in Hobart's opinion, the truth of [the Bonham]
111 I Ch. Rep. 1, 11-13, 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 487-88 (Ex. 1615).
112 Id. at 13, 21 Eng. Rep. at 488.
113 ELLEsIIERE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE [COKE] REPORTS 21, quoted in a footnote to
Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652 n.C. In the same footnote there is quoted from
Serjeant Hill's copy of the Observations Hill's comment "on the strictures of Lord
Ellesmere," the meat of which for present purposes is that Ellesmere condemned Coke's
statement "that a statute against reason is void" notwithstanding Coke "is supported
by many authorities." Like the Colonists, Hill singled out "against reason," leaving
"construction" by the wayside.
114 Hobart 85, 87, 80 Eng. Rep. 235, 237 (C.P. 1614). See also text accompanying
note 60 sitpra.
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doctrine was beyond dispute." 115 At least a Colonial lawyer might
so conclude.
Additional conformation for such a reading is furnished by a
treatise published in 1627 by Sir Henry Finch, Serjeant-at-Law,
wherein he stated, "[I]t is truly said, & all men must agree, that lawes
in deed repugnant to the law of reason are as well void as those that
cross the law of nature." "' This, says Gough, "indicates the
atmosphere in which lawyers were educated in the seventeenth
century" n and to a Colonial lawyer who did not bring finely-honed
modern scholarship to the exegesis of Finch, the latter might well seem
to justify acceptance of Coke's "against common right and reason" at
face value.118  Consider too Bishop Burnett's summary of the 1676
debate on the exclusion of the Duke of York from the Succession: "All
lawyers had great regard to fundamental laws. And it was a great
maxim among our lawyers, that even an act of Parliament against
Magna Carta was null of itself." :"
Praise of Coke's statement came in 1702 from no less a figure
than Chief Justice Holt:
[W]hat my Lord Coke says in Dr. Bonham's case . . . is
far from any extravagancy, for it is a very reasonable and
true saying, that if an Act of Parliament should ordain that
the same person should be party and Judge . . . it would be
a void Act of Parliament; for it is impossible that one should
be Judge and party . . . and an Act of Parliament can do
115 Plucknett, supra note 5, at 49.
116 H. FINcH, LAW OR A DiscouRsE THEREOF 76 (1627), quoted in GOUGH, supra
note 3, at 34.
117 GOUGH, supra note 3, at 34.
118 A 1657 Massachusetts case, Gidding v. Browne (Ipswich, Mass. 1657), 2
HUTCEINSoN PAPERs 1 (Prince Soc'y Pub. 1865) exhibits that understanding. A
town meeting had voted 100 pounds for the gift of a house to the minister; some of the
minority refused to pay, were distrained and brought suit. Justice Symonds held for
them, saying that "fundamental law" incfuded "[t]hat every subject shall and may
enjoy what he hath a civell right or title unto, soe as it cannot be taken from him." Id.
at 1, 2. Arguing "from the greater to the lesse," Symonds said that "if noe kinge or
parliament can justly enact and cause that one mans estate, in whole or part, may be
taken from him and given to another without his owne consent, then surely the major
part of a towne or other inferior powers cannot doe it." Id. at 5. He cited the 1627
Finch treatise: "lawes positive doe lose their force and are hoe lawes at all, which
are directly contrary to . . . fundamentall [law]." Id. at 5. Justice Symonds was
reversed by the General Court, not because his principles were rejected, but because,
the Court found, such a gift to the minister was lawful and customary, the minority
were heard at the town meeting, and the vote was carried by a majority and was
binding on the minority. Id. at 22-23.
Justice Symonds' view was in part embodied in the MASSACHUS=rS CONsIrru-
TION OF 1780, first part, art. X: "no part of the property of any individual, can,
with justice, be taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or
that of the representative body of the people. . . . And whenever the public
exigencies require, that the property of any individual should be appropriated to
public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor."
119 Quoted in GOUGE, supra note 3, at 148. But see 6 W. HoLDswORTH, supra
note 48, at 186 n.2 (2d ed. 1937).
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no wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty
odd . . . but it cannot make one that lives under a Govern-
ment Judge and party. An Act of Parliament may not make
adultery lawful, that is, it cannot make it lawful for A. to
lie with the wife of B ..... .120
Although Holt is torn between conflicting concepts, between respect
for an Act of Parliament and the conviction that it cannot make wrong
lawful,' he begins and ends with the restatement of the Bonham
doctrine, paying lip service to the dawning theory of legislative
supremacy.' Pre-Revolutionary America seized on that portion of
Holt which seemed consonant with what had gone before and which
responded to its own needs.
Finally there is the fact that the Bonham principle had been
repeated in the Viner, Bacon and Comyns Abridgments.w "[A] lot
of American law," said Professor Geobel, "came out of Bacon's and
Viner's Abridgments." "I Comyns was Chief Baron of the Court of
Exchequer, and as late as 1851 his Digest was referred to by Lord
Campbell as a book "of the highest authority." 115
Except for Streater's Case,"6 wherein John Streater sought
habeas corpus from a commitment by order of the Long Parliament
for publishing seditious pamphlets, no case to my knowledge departed
from the Coke doctrine prior to the American Revolution. In Streater
120 City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669, 687-88, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (K.B.
1702).
12 1 Plucknett, supra note 5, at 55.
I22 Compare Holts earlier statement in the King v. Earl of Banbury, Skinner
517, 526-27, 90 Eng. Rep. 231, 236 (K.B. 1694): "the Earl of Banbury can not be
ousted of his dignity but by attainder, or Act of Parliament . . . yet when this comes
incidently in question before them [the judges], they ought to adjudge and intermeddle
with it, and they adjudge things of as high a nature every day; for they construe and
expound Acts of Parliament, and adjudge them to be void."
GOUGe, supra note 3, at 11, asks whether the "true explanation of Holt's remarks
[in the Wood case] may not be that the older view of the relations between the courts
and acts of parliament, which Coke had expounded, had not yet been entirely super-
seded." See also Pollock, A Plea for Historical Interpretation, 39 L.Q. Rxv. 163, 165
(1923), quoted at note 10 supra.
'2 19 C. ViNtR, ABRnIDGEMENT 512-13, tit. "Statutes" (E. 6, p. 15) (1744) ; 4 J.
CoMYNs, DIGEST 340, tit. "Parliament" (1766). Compare the citation in 4 M. BACON,
ABRIDGEMNT 639, tit "Statutes" (E) (1759) to the statements of Holt, quoted
in the text accompanying note 120 supra.
'24 Goebel, Book Review (Ex Parte Clio), 54 COLUm. L. REv. 450, 455 (1954).
James Otis cited Bonharns Case "from the extract of it in 19 Viner, Abridgement,"
2 J. ADAI S, LEGAL PAPERS 128 n.73 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965). See also
id. at 144. A quick search of the Adams volume discloses frequent citations of Viner
and Bacon by Otis, Adams and Blower. Id. at 163, 228, 269, 284, 341, 348, 350, 424,
427, 428, 430. The Abridgements remained respected authority in the English courts,
cf. Martin v. Mackonochie, [1878] L.R. 3 Q.B.D. 730, 749-50; Mayor of London v.
Cox, [1867] L.R. 2 E. & I. App. 239, 290 (1867).
=Wadsworth v. The Queen of Spain [1851] 17 Q.B. 171, 214, 117 Eng. Rep.
1246, 1262.
12 5 How. St. Tr. 365 (K.B. 1653).
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Chief Justice Rolle said, "an inferior court cannot controul what the
Parliament does." 127 Whether this was because of Cromwell's mighty
shadow or because the commitment was deemed to resemble Parlia-
ment's power to protect itself from insult,' deserves exploration.
Plucknett, on the other hand, considers Blackstone's conclusion that
no power can control Parliament "typical of the best judicial
opinion," " expressed in such cases as The Duchess of Hamilton's
Case," ° Great Charte v. Kennington,' and The Mersey Docks &
Harbour Board Trustees v. Gibbs.' Mersey, an 1866 decision, may
be regarded as irrelevant to judicial opinion in 1765. In the Hamilton
case, says Plucknett, counsel for plaintiff argued that Hobart stated,
"an Act of Parliament may be void from its first Creation, as an Act
against Natural Equity . . . . But this must be a very clear Case,
and Judges will strain hard rather than interpret an Act void ab
initio." ' The court found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional
issue, interpreting the statute to be inapplicable to the defendant.
Plucknett concludes that the "application of Coke's principle is now
to be decently veiled under the cloak of 'interpretation'." 134 However,
plaintiff's counsel and the court were in fact, primarily concerned with
a genuine question of "interpretation," that is, with the meaning of
the statute 13" rather than with an acknowledged meaning (such as
words making a party judge in his own cause) that made the statute
void. In such a case there can be no doubt that a reading that would
lead to a judgment that the statute is void is not lightly to be made.
The Kennington case, says Plucknett, was "[a] decisive step
in the destruction of [Coke's] theory . . . when it . . . held that
although it was a good principle that a man should not be judge and
party, yet if a situation arose in which the only competent judge
assigned by statute was interested in the dispute, he could, and ought
to proceed notwithstanding." 6 As Grand Junction Canal Co. v.
Dimes explained, "A failure of justice was . . . considered to be a
127 Id. at 386; see GoUGH, supra note 3, at 130-32. Pickthorn, in another context,
observed that "it would be easy to hang too much deduction on the expression of
[judicial] timidity" at moments of revolutionary crisis. PICKTHORN, supra note 48,
at 134.
128 Cf. Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post-Mortem, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 602,
611 (1942).
129 Plucknett, supra note 5, at 60.
130 Thornby v. Fleetwood, 10 Mod. 114, 88 Eng. Rep. 651 (C.P. 1713).
1312 Strange 1173, 93 Eng. Rep. 1107 (K.B. 1742).
132 L.R. 1 E. & I. App. 93 (1866).
'33 10 Mod. at 115, 88 Eng. Rep. at 653, quoted in Plucknett, supra note 5, at 58.
34 Plucknett, supra note 5, at 58.
135 10 Mod. at 115, 88 Eng. Rep. at 653.
136 Plucknett, supra note 5, at 58.
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greater evil than a departure from that fundamental rule, that a party
interested cannot be a Judge." 137 Neither court touched upon the
power of the judiciary to set aside Acts of Parliament; and the fact
that an exception was grafted upon a particular rule which had fur-
nished the occasion for articulation of the Bonham "against reason"
nowise diminished the doctrine.
Of course, I would not intimate that one can assign a definitive
meaning to words uttered by Coke 360 years ago. The glosses put by
present-day scholars upon his words seem to me, however, over-subtle
and debatable, and therefore I elect at the risk of being simplistic-
the eighth deadly sin-to construe "against reason" as did his im-
mediate predecessor, Doctor and Student, that is, as prohibited by the
law of nature. It did not require acceptance of such later concepts as
separation of powers and the like to declare judicially what was gen-
erally accepted: a "positive" law that violated the law of nature was
"no law." Although the words were uttered in deciding a private
dispute and presumably carried no implication of challenge to Parlia-
ment, they readily lent themselves in later days to direct defiance of
Parliamentary arbitrariness. When the Colonists concluded that
Parliament was intolerably abusing its power, they not unjustifiably
took Coke's words, which meanwhile had been repeated respectfully by
judges and in the Abridgments for 150 years, at face value. That they
went on to fashion from Coke's phrase "constitutional theory" that did
not enter into his thinking does not deprive it of the meaning that it
bears on its face: an Act of Parliament "against common right and
reason" is void. And if it is indeed void, what is more logical than
that a court may say so?
137 12 Beav. 63, 77, 50 Eng. Rep. 984, 989 (Rolls Ct. 1849).
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